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INTRODUCTION
Section 1981 mandates that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens."1 For the past two decades, plaintiffs have relied
successfully on the statute in suits alleging racial discrimination
within an employment relationship, including "post-formation"
claims such as racial harassment and racially-motivated denial of
promotion. In 1989, however, by a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court
rejected this expansive reading of § 1981. Patterson v McLean
Credit Union2 strictly limited the application of § 1981 to infringe-
ments of the right to make and enforce contracts, holding that
those protected rights did not include post-formation conduct like
racial harassment.
Patterson was one of the most controversial decisions of the
1988 term, and legislation presently pending before Congress
would restore § 1981 to its pre-Patterson scope. Though eventual
amendment of § 1981 seems likely, lower courts must contend in
the interim with Patterson's somewhat vague guidance. The Court
did not explicitly define what the right to "make or enforce" a con-
tract includes. The Court did, however, briefly explore one com-
mon type of "post-formation" conduct: the discriminatory denial
t A.B. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
1 42 USC § 1981 (1982).
2 109 S Ct 2363 (1989).
3 Specifically, the legislation would amend § 1981 to include the following "For pur-
poses of this section, the right to 'make and enforce contracts' shall include the making,
performance, modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship." Civil Rights Act of 1990,
HR 4000/S 2104, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 7, 1990). Passage of the bill may be complicated
by the inclusion of several controversial amendments to Title VII; conservative legislators in
both houses have responded by drafting legislation which would amend only § 1981. See
Civil Rights Protections Act of 1990, HR 4081/S 2166, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 22, 1990).
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of employment promotions.4 Rather than ruling that promotion
decisions are not actionable under § 1981, as it had with racial har-
assment, 'the Court noted that promotions rising to the level of a
"new and distinct relation" remain protected under § 1981. Be-
cause the defendant in Patterson had not challenged the promo-
tion claim, the Court did not address the issue further. But lower
courts faced with § 1981 promotion claims in the wake of Patter-
son have based their holdings on the "new and distinct relation"
language.
The meaning of these words is far from clear, leading the
courts to a wide array of outcomes. At least one lower court has
recognized that § 1981 liability may exist where the promotion
would involve a mere change in salary,6 while another has held that
all promotion practices constitute post-formation conduct beyond
the reach of § 1981.7 A promotion from clerk to supervisor coupled
with an increase in responsibility and pay has been found to satisfy
Patterson,8 while a promotion from supervisor to manager has
not.9 Most of these courts have resolved the cases by applying ad
hoc criteria to the facts rather than deriving a clear principle of
§ 1981 interpretation. In short, an important federal remedy is in
considerable flux.
This Comment offers an interpretation of "new and distinct
relation" that courts can use to determine which discriminatory
denials of promotions are redressable under § 1981. The Comment
begins with a brief historical overview of § 1981's application to
private discriminatory denials of promotion, and with a discussion
of the Patterson decision itself. Patterson does not define "new
and distinct relation," but it does suggest two underlying concerns:
that only promotions equivalent to making a contract be actiona-
ble under § 1981, and that those promotions be somehow similar
' In the first four and one-half months following the Patterson decision, at least ninety-
six discrimination claims in fifty cases were dismissed, of which sixteen were promotion
claims. Linda P. Campbell, Racial Bias Lawsuits Founder After Ruling, Chicago Tribune 10
(Nov 20, 1989).
5 109 S Ct at 2377.
6 Fowler v McCrory Corp., 727 F Supp 228, 230 n 1 (D Md 1989).
7 Newman v University of the District of Columbia, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 12346, *22-
24 (D DC).
8 Mallory v Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., Inc., 882 F2d 908, 910 (4th Cir 1989).
9 Anderson, et al v United Parcel Service, Inc., 1989 US Dist LEXIS 12195, *3-7 (N D
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to that in Hishon v King & Spalding,0 a Title VII case involving
the discriminatory denial of a promotion. Thus, any interpretation
of "new and distinct relation" must fit within the parameters of
contract law and Hishon while simultaneously reducing the num-
ber of discriminatory promotion denials actionable under § 1981.
Finding that neither contract law nor Title VII alone can address
both concerns and define a "new and distinct relation," this Com-
ment synthesizes principles from both sources to establish a defini-
tion consonant with Patterson. The Comment concludes that for a
discriminatory promotion denial to rise to the level of a "new and
distinct relation," the claimed promotion must have involved a
mutual, tangible change in responsibilities and wages and must not
have been granted routinely to similarly situated workers. This
definition is consistent with the Court's suggested focus and can
guide future promotion decisions towards fair and predictable
solutions.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
A. Patterson and the History of Section 1981
For much of its history, § 1981 lay more or less dormant, lim-
ited by Supreme Court decisions to public, not private, acts of dis-
crimination.1 ' In 1968, the Court seemed to open the way to apply-
ing the statute to private discrimination, 2 and by 1976 there was
no longer any doubt that, as the Court stated in Runyon v Mc-
Crary, § 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and
enforcement of private contracts."'" Section 1981 thus became an
important source for civil rights claims.' 4 It was not until Patter-
son, however, that the Court squarely confronted the role of § 1981
in the employment context.
20 467 US 69 (1984). Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" based on an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
" See Corrigan v Buckley, 271 US 323, 331 (1925), limiting an early version of § 1981
to acts of public discrimination and, even more restrictively, Hodges v United States, 203
US 1 (1906), limiting it to acts reducing the individual to slavery. See also Civil Rights
Cases, 109 US 3, 22-24 (1883). Hodges was expressly overruled in Jones v Alfred H. Mayer
Company, 392 US 409, 441-43 n 78 (1968).
12 Jones, 392 US 409 (concerning not § 1981 but the companion provision, § 1982).
Is 427 US 160, 168 (1976) (citing Jones and Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 US 454 (1975)).
14 For a statistical analysis of § 1981's use, see Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart
Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 Cornell L Rev 596, 602 (1988).
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The Court gredtly curtailed the scope of § 1981 in Patterson.
Many circuits had been applying § 1981 to a wide range of "post-
formation" acts, including discrimination in termination, failure to
promote, racial harassment, and retaliatory discharge following the
filing of a § 1981 or Title VII complaint. 15 The Patterson majority
construed the language of § 1981 far more narrowly, interpreting
the right "to make and enforce contracts" as extending only to the
formation of the contract, not to post-formation conduct.16 After
affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's racial harassment claim,
concluding that harassment on the job involved neither a refusal to
make a contract with the plaintiff nor an impairment of the plain-
tiff's ability to enforce her contract rights, the Court considered
the plaintiff's charge that she had been denied a promotion based
on her race. The Fourth Circuit had stated that "[c]laims of ra-
cially discriminatory.., promotion go to the very existence and
nature of the employment contract and thus fall easily within
§ 1981's protection." 17 The Supreme Court, noting that such a
conclusion "somewhat overstates the case,"18 attempted to conform
the promotion analysis to its narrowed interpretation of § 1981.
Thus, the Court determined that
whether a promotion claim is actionable under § 1981 de-
pends upon whether the nature of the change in position was
such that it involved the opportunity to enter into a new con-
tract with the employer .... Only where the promotion rises
to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation
between the employee and the employer is such a claim ac-
tionable under § 1981.18
The Court did not define what it meant by a "new and dis-
tinct relation." Its only guidance was an enigmatic citation to a
Title VII employment case, Hishon v King & Spalding.2 ° In
Hishon, an Atlanta law firm had failed to consider a female associ-
11 A few examples include: Lopez v S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F2d 1184 (2d Cir 1987);
Strong v Mercantile Trust Co. N.A., 816 F2d 429 (8th Cir 1987); Warren v Halstead Indus-
tries, Inc., 802 F2d 746 (4th Cir 1986); and Hunter v Allis-Chalmers Corp. Engine Division,
797 F2d 1417 (7th Cir 1986). See also the promotion denial cases discussed in the text at
note 42.
16 109 S Ct at 2372-73.
17 Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 805 F2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir 1986). The Fourth
Circuit did hold, however, that § 1981 does not encompass racial harassment claims. Id at
1146.
18 Patterson, 109 S Ct at 2377.
19 Id (emphasis added).
20 467 US 69 (1984).
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ate for partnership at the same time as male colleagues in the same
associate class. The Court reversed the lower court's decision that
Title VII was inapplicable, holding that the plaintiff could prove
on remand that her employer had "made a contract to consider her
for partnership," and that, if proven, a discriminatory refusal to
consider her would violate Title VII.2' Since the Patterson Court
explicitly declined to make § 1981 coextensive with Title VII, the
citation to Hishon presumably was intended to illustrate the kind
of discriminatory denial of a promotion that would still be actiona-
ble under § 1981.22
The only other clue offered by the Court in Patterson was its
reliance on the making of contractual relationships as the standard
for § 1981 liability. As Patterson's reading of § 1981 is fundamen-
tally about contracts, any attempt to define "new and distinct rela-
tion" would naturally turn to contract law principles for guidance.
Combined with the citation to Hishon, the Court's focus suggests
that only those promotions that would be "new and distinct"
under contract principles and that would be similar to the promo-
tion denied in Hishon are actionable under § 1981.
B. The Response to Patterson
Most courts faced with promotion cases since Patterson have
resorted to ad hoc determinations of whether the post-promotion
employment agreement was sufficiently "new and distinct"; at
most, courts have engaged in a rough comparison of the facts
presented to those of Hishon. Other courts have in effect ignored
Patterson, offering interpretations under which almost all promo-
tions would be actionable,2" or under which no promotions would
be actionable. 24 Neither extreme is consistent with Patterson's in-
22 Id at 74.
2 In Patterson, the Court expressly preserved Title VII as a remedy in discriminatory
promotion cases. Title VII remedies are more limited, however, than those in § 1981. First,
Title VII reaches only businesses with fifteen or more employees, leaving fifteen percent of
the workforce unprotected. Patterson, 109 S Ct at 2391 (Brennan dissenting). Second, Title
VII does not include the right to a jury trial. Id. Third, it restricts backpay recovery to two
years prior to filing a complaint and disallows punitive and compensatory damages. See
Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 US 454, 460 (1975). Fourth, the statute of
limitations can be substantially shorter under Title VII than under § 1981. Developments
in the Law-Section 1981, 15 Harv CR-CL L Rev 29, 105 (1980). Finally, Title VII's admin-
istrative requirements are more burdensome than those of § 1981. See id.
23 Fowler v McCrory Corp., 727 F Supp 228, 230 n 1 (D Md 1989).
U Newman v University of the District of Columbia, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 12346, *22-
24 (D DC).
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tent to reduce, but not eliminate, the number of promotions ac-
tionable under § 1981.
Though not exemplars of judicial decisionmaking, these lower
court decisions do illustrate the kinds of cases a post-Patterson
framework must accommodate. The courts that rejected plaintiffs'
claims of discriminatory denial of promotion were, for the most
part, presented with promotions involving a change in pay without
a corresponding increase in responsibilities. Typical of these cases
is Williams v National Railroad Passenger Corp.,25 in which a dis-
trict court held that mere pay raises are not cognizable under
§ 1981: "[h]igher pay is a part of nearly all promotions and by it-
self can hardly make a promotion a 'new and distinct relation.' ",28
Similarly, in Dicker v Allstate Life Insurance Co.,2" the court re-
jected the plaintiff's claim for relief where the promotion would
have represented merely one step up a long ladder toward an even-
tual management position; the promotion itself entailed no new re-
sponsibilities and no change from hourly wages to salary. Notably,
both the Williams and Dicker opinions were expressed in con-
clusory terms, with no reliance on any interpretive principle.28
Other courts have rejected § 1981 claims where the promotion
would have involved new responsibilities but no change in pay. In
Anderson v United Parcel Service, Inc.,2 9 for example, a promo-
tion from supervisor to manager created no automatic salary in-
crease, thus weakening plaintiff's claim. Finally, some courts have
rejected claims involving increased responsibilities and increased
pay, holding that the raise was somehow not "significant"
enough.30 Indeed, Patterson itself was dismissed on remand be-
cause the promotion was only from one hourly wage position to
25 716 F Supp 49 (D DC 1989).
26 Id at 51.
27 730 F Supp 111, 112, 114 (N D Ill 1989). See also Williams v Chase Manhattan
Bank, 728 F Supp 1004, 1009 (S D NY 1990) (promotion from one supervisory position to
another entails no new responsibilities); and White v Federal Express Corp., 52 FEP Cases
(BNA) 108, 113-14 (E D Va 1990) (dismissing a suit where there would be a change, but no
increase, in responsibilities, making the promotion more like a lateral transfer).
28 A variation of this scenario can be found in Sofferin v American Airlines, Inc.,717 F
Supp 597 (N D Ill 1989), in which an Illinois district court held that a promotion from
probationary to tenured status failed to rise to the level of a "new and distinct relation"; the
court found that although the promotion would have entailed a substantial increase in job
security, plaintiff's job duties would have remained identical. Again, the court based its
holding solely on a comparison to the situation in Hishon rather than on an analysis of the
meaning of "new and distinct relation."
29 1989 US Dist LEXIS 12195, *6 n 3 (N D III).
30 See id at *5-6. See also White, 52 FEP Cases (BNA) at 113.
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another.31 Nonetheless, § 1981 claims based on promotions that
entail an increase in both responsibilities and wages account for
the majority of successful plaintiffs' actions. Typical of these cases
is Luna v City and County of Denver,2 in which a district court
found a promotion from "Project Inspector I" to "Engineer III" to
include a substantial change in "supervisory responsibility, duties
performed, and required qualifications," as well as a conversion
from wages to salary, thus meeting the Patterson standard.
Other courts have relied on a hodgepodge of factors in recog-
nizing liability under § 1981. In Green v Kinney Shoe Corp.,s3 the
court looked at whether the plaintiff's employer would evaluate
him differently in his new job and whether he would have been
considered for higher managerial positions. Post-promotion analy-
sis may be at its most unstructured in Hudgens v Harper-Grace
Hospitals,34 where a Michigan district court noted numerous fac-
tors to be considered, such as changes in pay, duties, responsibili-
ties, status (from hourly to salaried employee), required qualifica-
tions, potential liability, and pension and other benefits. The court
noted that triers of fact must consider, in light of Patterson,
not only the number of resulting changes, but the magnitude
of individual changes, and of the changes as a whole. A signifi-
cant single change.., would be enough to satisfy Patterson.
In instances of smaller changes ... a combination of two or
more changes would be necessary to work a new relation be-
tween the parties. 5
In sum, the post-Patterson responses may be grouped to some
extent by factual similarities, but the courts have based their out-
comes on ad hoc comparisons of the factual scenario presented and
the facts of previous cases. Thus, what little consistency one does
find is largely the result of a rapidly building body of indepen-
dently inadequate case law.
31 729 F Supp 35 (M D NC 1990). The court noted that "the situation would be differ-
ent if plaintiff were alleging the denial of a promotion from an hourly wage position to a
salaried position." Id at 36.
32 718 F Supp 854, 856-57 (D Colo 1989). See also Williams v Chase Manhattan Bank,
728 F Supp at 1009 ("increased supervisory responsibility and salary modification" are fac-
tors "militating toward" finding a new and distinct relation). Compare Miller v Shawmut
Bank of Boston N.A., 726 F Supp 337 (D Mass 1989); and Hopeton Matthews v Northern
Telecom, Inc., 1989 US Dist LEXIS 12926, *5-6 (S D NY).
33 728 F Supp 768, 777 (D DC 1989).
34 728 F Supp 1321, 1324-26 (E D Mich 1990).
35 Id at 1325-26.
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In developing a more principled interpretation of the phrase
"new and distinct relation," it will be important to consider addi-
tional areas of law that the courts have used to resolve other ambi-
guities pertaining to § 1981. First, as § 1981 is a law aimed not
simply at contracts, but at civil rights, many gaps have been filled
by analogy to Title VII.36 Second, because § 1981 fundamentally
involves contract rights, many questions have been answered by
reference to the principles of contract law.3 7 With its use of con-
tract terms and its reference to Hishon, Patterson counsels resort
to both. In the sections that follow, this Comment first looks to
Title VII in defining the "new and distinct relation" standard, and
then turns to contract law for assistance.
II. TITLE VII AND HISHON
Prior to Patterson, the federal courts had uniformly "em-
ployed Title VII principles as a benchmark" against which the op-
eration of § 1981 should be measured. 8 In § 1981 cases, courts
have adopted Title VII standards for affirmative action plans,39
seniority systems,40 and federal law preemption. 1 Courts have
even treated the two statutes as if they both contained the same
elements of proof.'2
Such immediate equation of the statutes is no longer tenable
after Patterson, in which the Court attempted to limit the kinds of
promotions cognizable under § 1981 and preserve Title VII as the
exclusive remedy for at least some discrimination claims.' There
are additional reasons, moreover, why Title VII cannot be used to
interpret § 1981. First, it is somewhat anachronistic to define
§ 1981 according to Title VII principles. As Justice Brennan
', See notes 38-42.
See text at notes 50-54.
' Davis v County of Los Angeles, 566 F2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir 1977). See also Waters v
Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502 F2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir 1974).
39 Setser v Novack Investment Co., 657 F2d 962, 967-68 (8th Cir 1981).
"0 Patterson v American Tobacco Co., 535 F2d 257, 270 (4th Cir 1976).
41 McAlester v United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir 1988).
See, for example, Lewis v University of Pittsburgh, 725 F2d 910, 915 n 5 (3d Cir
1983). Compare Mozee v Jefiboat, Inc., 746 F2d 365, 369 n 5 (7th Cir 1984) (promotion out
of the plaintiff class does not bar Title VII claim).
'3 See Jones v Alltech Associates, Inc., 1989 US Dist LEXIS 10422 (N D Ill). See also
Patterson, 109 S Ct at 2373:
:.. post formation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but rather
implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of
continuing employment, matters more naturally governed by state contract law and
Title VII.
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points out in his Patterson dissent, it is doubtful that a law passed
by the Reconstruction Congress was designed to accommodate a
statute drafted a century later.44 Moreover, it should be recalled
that § 1981 was not revived as a means of addressing private dis-
crimination until several years after the passage of Title VII,4"
leading one to question whether Title VII could possibly have been
drafted to fill gaps left by § 1981.
Second, the cases using Title VII provisions to interpret
§ 1981 involved procedural issues, the results of which would vary
depending on whether § 1981 was viewed strictly as a means of
contract dispute resolution or as a federal civil rights statute. The
issue before us now, however, is the fundamental basis of § 1981,
not simply a procedural issue left open by the statute. Thus, how-
ever valuable Title VII may be as a tool for filling in the contours
of § 1981, it does not follow that substantive issues-specifically,
the applicability of § 1981 to discriminatory promotion prac-
tices-should be resolved by reference to Title VII.
Nonetheless, Patterson's citation to Hishon v King & Spald-
ing, immediately following the "new and distinct relation" lan-
guage,46 indicates that Title VII interpretations remain relevant to
the question before us. In Hishon, a female associate in a law firm
claimed she had been denied partnership on account of her sex in
violation of Title VII. A unanimous Supreme Court agreed, holding
Title VII applicable to "employees" of law firms. The Court's most
obvious reason for referring to Hishon in Patterson was to provide
one clear example of a promotion that rose to the level of a new
and distinct relation cognizable under § 1981-namely, the leap
from associate to partner.
In addition to this illustrative purpose, however, the Hishon
citation suggests a means of interpreting § 1981 consistent with
the Court's new restrictive policy. Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion in the terms and conditions of employment.47 Yet Hishon did
not find the promotion from associate to partner itself to be a
44 Patterson, 109 S Ct at 2379 (Brennan dissenting). See also Guardians Ass'n of New
York City Police Dept., Inc. v Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 633 F2d
232, 266 (2d Cir 1980) ("the breadth of the term 'contracts'... militates against reading
into this century-old statute modem concepts developed primarily in the specialized area of
employment discrimination"; holding that the more recently developed disparate impact
standard could not be adapted into § 1981, which requires a finding of discriminatory
intent).
46 See text at note 13.
46 Patterson, 109 S Ct at 2377.
4 See note 10.
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"term of employment." Rather, the Court held that if the plaintiff
showed that her employer had "made a contract to consider her for
partnership... that promise clearly was a term, condition, or priv-
ilege of her employment."4 The natural inference is that certain
promotions do not intrinsically constitute terms of employment,
but might by virtue of a contractual guarantee of a promotion.
Thus, "new and distinct relation" can be defined as comprising
promotions that are not themselves contractually guaranteed by
the employer, regardless of any promise to consider granting such
a promotion. Under such an analysis, a promotion would most
clearly be considered a term or condition of employment, and con-
sequently fall outside of § 1981's protection, when the promotion
was implicit in the original employment agreement, or when it was
an automatic feature of the employment relation.
In illustration of this distinction, consider that promotion
from associate to partner is not (regrettably) a standard condition
of employment granted automatically after a period of time.
Rather, partnership comes only with a lengthy investment of time
and effort on the employee's part, and only some employees even-
tually obtain such a promotion. Indeed, the fact that an employer
tends to offer partnership consideration as a contractual term
strengthens the inference that such a promotion is not implicit in
the original employment agreement. The same argument can be
made for any number of promotions that are not granted routinely,
but only as a result of some level of achievement.
Not all promotions, of course, are based on discretion or
achievement. Consider the scenario in which a worker has simply
been denied a raise, or a promotion to a slightly higher position on
t6e job ladder without any corresponding increase in wages. Here,
a court may find that such a change in position or pay is generally
granted as a matter of course to employees after some specified
length of employment. Thus, although such promotions clearly lie
within the "terms of employment," they fall short of "new and dis-
tinct relations"; Title VII is applicable, but § 1981 is not.4 e
48 Hishon, 467 US at 74-75 (emphasis added).
"9 Because it explicitly prohibits discrimination with respect to compensation, Title VII
seems clearly to encompass the denial of a promotion involving a mere increase in wages,
offering further justification for keeping such a promotion beyond the grasp of § 1981
(under this analysis).
A variation on this analysis was alluded to in one early post-Patterson case. In Malho-
tra v Cotter & Co., 885 F2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir 1989), the court took notice of
the anomaly created by a rule that a stranger to the firm could sue under section 1981
if his application for a position was turned down on racial grounds but a person already
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The Hishon analysis, however, is not sufficient to define the
new standard. The Court clearly wanted only promotions that are
analogous to new contracts to be cognizable under § 1981. Further-
more, Patterson's scaling back of § 1981 rests primarily on the
Court's new emphasis on the actual making of a contract. The
Hishon analysis tells us nothing about whether the plaintiff and
employer were prevented from making a "new" contract by the
discrimination; it tells us only which types of new contracts are
sufficiently "distinct" to narrow § 1981's applicability to a subset
of promotions. Thus, the next section of this Comment examines
principles of contract law in order to determine which potential
promotions can be considered "new" contracts.
III. CONTRACT LAW
A. Framing the Analogy
Because Patterson does not explicitly command the use of
contract principles in analyzing § 1981 claims, but merely estab-
lishes the making and formation of a contract as the touchstones
of liability, a definition incorporating these contract principles
should be justified in the case law. There is in fact considerable
precedent for borrowing contract principles to clarify the scope of
§ 1981. Section 1981 itself looks to state law in other contexts, such
as in determining the applicable statute of limitations 50 and, some-
times, in ascertaining whether § 1981 can be applied to situations
outside the employment context. Courts have often turned to sub-
stantive contract principles in non-employment contexts where it
was unclear whether a "contract" protectable by § 1981 existed. In
Cook v Advertiser Company, for example, the defendant, a news-
paper, had refused to publish the wedding announcements of non-
whites on its society page, and plaintiff sued under § 1981. The
Fifth Circuit held that because the questionnaires used by the
newspaper did not amount to an offer to publish the information,
and the newspaper received no consideration from the plaintiff, no
employed by the firm could not sue even though his application for the identical posi-
tion was turned down on the identical grounds.
The analysis suggested by Hishon would solve this problem by equating those promotions
that are not routinely granted to awarding a position to an outsider, as both employment
opportunities are sufficiently "new and distinct" that the plaintiff is really "making" a
contract.
50 Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 US 454, 461 (1975).
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binding contract existed. In the absence of a contractual relation-
ship, § 1981 could not be invoked.51
Nor is reference to substantive state contract law unprece-
dented in § 1981 employment discrimination cases. In the recent
case of Judie v Hamilton, the plaintiff alleged that his employer
had refused to permit him to perform the supervisory duties con-
tained in his job description.52 Looking to Washington state consti-
tutional and common law, the court concluded that plaintiff's job
description did not create contractual expectancies, thereby negat-
ing his § 1981 claim.53
Such use of contract law is not compelled by precedent, how-
ever. At least one court has found state contract law inapplicable
in determining § 1981's substantive scope within the sphere of em-
ployment relations, holding that § 1981 rests upon a much broader
definition of "contract," one that includes any mutual exchange of
promises.54 Thus, because in that case the sheriff had promised to
pay his deputy a set salary, and his deputy had promised to per-
form his job, the relationship was sufficient to fall under § 1981's
protection.5 Other courts have rejected state contract law as a
benchmark of § 1981's scope due to the inconsistent outcomes that
would result. These courts have recognized that § 1981, being a
federal law, should not be impaired by substantive irregularities of
state law (as opposed to procedural differences, such as statutes of
limitations) .
In addition to those courts expressly rejecting a state contract
law analysis of § 1981, many cases addressing § 1981's statute of
limitations contain language discouraging such reliance. In Good-
man v Lukens Steel Co., the Supreme Court held that the statute
1 458 F2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir 1972). More recently, in Murray v National Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc., 844 F2d 988 (2d Cir 1988), the plaintiff alleged that he had proposed the
original concept for The Cosby Show to NBC, which had then stolen his idea and turned it
over to a production team. Plaintiff, who was black, charged that the defendant had violated
§ 1981 by discriminatorily refusing to contract with him regarding his television show propo-
sal, contracting instead with white producers. The Second Circuit relied exclusively on New
York contract law in asserting that no contract right could exist in a non-novel idea. The
court therefore concluded that, because plaintiff's concept was non-novel under New York
law, "there could be no consideration for the alleged promise and hence no enforceable con-
tract right upon which to base a section 1981 claim." Id at 995 (citations omitted).
52 872 F2d 919 (9th Cir 1989).
'3 Id at 923 (citations omitted).
Adams v McDougal, 695 F2d 104, 108 (5th Cir 1983) (citing Cook, 458 F2d at 1123
(Wisdom concurring)).
55 Adams, 695 F2d at 108.
56 See Waters v Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F2d 1309, 1316 (7th
Cir 1974) and other cases cited in notes 38-41.
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of limitations for state tort claims, rather than for contract claims,
must be applied to § 1981 actions. 7 Justice White, writing for the
majority, reasoned that § 1981 deals with a "fundamental injury to
the individual rights of a person," not simply the breach of con-
tractual rights. 8
Of course, the characterization of § 1981 as tort-oriented for
one purpose does not render the borrowing of contract principles
inappropriate in all circumstances. One might consider the statute
as similar to the tort of interference with contractual relations,
which possesses elements of both tort and contract. This tort im-
poses liability where the tortfeasor interferes with one party's con-
tract rights with another, incorporating traditional tort analysis of
intent and causation.59 At the same time, the tort depends upon
the existence of a valid contract,60 requiring the court to look for
an underlying contract before determining whether to impose
liability.
Nonetheless, the parallel between this tort and § 1981 does
not necessarily bolster the argument for a contract analysis of
§ 1981's scope. Courts tend to permit suits under this tort for
"[v]irtually any type of contract," including employment at will,
even where the contract itself is unenforceable.0 1 One may there-
fore conclude that where such a tort is involved, the courts tend to
be quite liberal in their interpretation of the underlying contract,
concentrating instead on the wrongful act. The language of the
§ 1981 statute of limitations cases suggests a similar inclination
where contract law is invoked. Such a broad reading of a contract
clearly was not what the Patterson Court intended.
57 482 US 656 (1987).
53 Id at 661. Prior to Goodman, the lower courts had argued vociferously about
whether, for statute of limitations purposes, § 1981 sounded in tort or in contract In the
words of one district court advocating the tort position:
§ 1981 recognizes ... a status of racial equality in making and enforcing contracts, and
impliedly imposes on all persons a duty not to interfere by racial discrimination with
that status. An action alleging that defendant's breach of that duty caused injury to
plaintiff's enjoyment of that status sounds in tort because plaintiff's right and defend-
ant's duty are based on a statute embodying a social policy of equality of opportu-
nity. . . rather than embodying a policy with respect to express or implied promises of
the parties.
Ware v Colonial Provision Co., Inc., 458 F Supp 1193, 1195-96 (D Mass 1978); see also cases
cited therein at 1195.
59 William L. Prosser and W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts §129 at 978, 989-94 (cau-
sation), 997 (intent) (West, 5th ed 1984).
60 Id at 994-95.
61 Id at 994-96.
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Finally, Patterson itself may be read to discourage the use of
contract principles in interpreting the scope of § 1981. The Solici-
tor General had argued to the Court that, at least with respect to
harassment claims, § 1981 requires courts "to look outside § 1981
to the terms of particular contracts and to state law for the obliga-
tions and covenants to be protected by the federal statute." 2 The
Court countered that such an interpretation would permit a
§ 1981 claim whenever a breach of contract claim alleged racial
animus, a result at odds with both legislative intent and the
Court's own reluctance to create a federal right of action for tradi-
tional state contract claims. 3 The Court reasoned that, even
though the breach of contract may have been caused by racial har-
assment, a remedy still existed under state law and there was.noth-
ing in § 1981 indicating a congressional desire to federalize state
breach of contract claims. 4
This conclusion, however, creates some inconsistency within
Patterson, suggesting that it not be applied too rigidly. Precisely
because it calls for a more restrictive treatment than the Title VII
standard, Patterson requires resort to state contract law for inter-
pretive guidance: it will not always be obvious whether a "new and
distinct relation" exists.6 5 In the wake of Patterson, some analysis
of the contractual relation has become necessary even within the
employment context.
Thus, despite courts' uncertain authority to examine state
contract law principles in interpreting substantive provisions of
§ 1981, the reliance of Patterson on the making of a contract for
creating liability and the difficulty of determining which promo-
tions constitute a "new and distinct" contract relation seem to re-
quire at least consideration of contract principles as a means of
fleshing out § 1981 and Patterson.
B. Applying the Analogy
A promotion can be viewed in one of two ways: as no different
than an initial contract, or as an evolution of a prior contract. Two
principles of contract law seem to apply to these situations. Con-
tract law will recognize an initial negotiation as a new contract if
62 109 S Ct at 2375.
63 Id at 2376.
e4 Id.
"' The Supreme Court commented in Hishon, by contrast, that "an informal contract of
employment may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a
workplace." 467 US at 74.
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sufficient consideration is present, while it will recognize an evolu-
tionary deal as a new contract if the original contract has been
modified. This section examines the principles of consideration
and modification in an effort to determine which promotions can
rise to the level of the "new" contract required by Patterson.
The traditional hornbook definition of "consideration" re-
quires a promise supported by some benefit to the promisor or
some detriment to the promisee.6 6 For example, suppose that Wil-
liam Worker charges Ellen Employer with discriminatorily denying
him a promotion. The typical promotion would involve an ex-
change on both sides, Worker promising to fulfill more duties and
Employer promising greater pay. As both parties would be ex-
changing a benefit and a detriment, this promotion would consti-
tute a "new" contract actionable under § 1981.
"Consideration" could be used to define "new and distinct re-
lation" by assuming that one achieves a "new and distinct rela-
tion" when one makes an agreement supported by consideration.
But in fact many promotions are not supported by consideration.
Imagine a promotion whereby Worker receives a raise with no
change in duties, or one in which Employer exacts a change in re-
sponsibilities with no increase in wages. In such a case, one party
has made a promise (either to pay more or to work harder) with no
corresponding detriment to the other side. Thus, under a simple
consideration analysis, Worker's claim that he was denied this par-
ticular type of promotion will not be actionable under § 1981: ab-
sent consideration, he has not been denied the right to enter into a
contract.
The flaw in reading this theory of consideration into § 1981 is
that it presumes that either the benefit or the detriment must be
objectively quantifiable. Can one realistically think of Worker or
Employer as making a promise unsupported by consideration? Is
Employer simply giving Worker a gift of higher wages? Is Worker
simply making a gratuitous promise to undertake greater responsi-
bility? Clearly not: neither party would be making a promise with-
out expecting something in return. In the situation where Em-
ployer has given Worker a raise, one may safely assume that she
has done so to ensure his continued employment. Whether under a
regime of employment at will or for-cause termination, Worker
may quit at any time, and periodic increases in wages serve Em-
ployer's interests in encouraging continued service. In the words of
46 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §1.6 at 20 (Little, Brown, 1982).
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one state court, "by continuing to stay on the job, although free to
leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for the of-
fer" 8'-the offer in our example being the proffered pay raise.
Similarly, Worker may accept a new position without a change
in compensation for any number of personal reasons. Such a move
may entail certain non-tangible benefits, or may be a necessary
step on the career ladder towards a more "significant" promotion.
As one court has noted, a new position constitutes a "'promotion,'
although it does not represent an immediate increase in pay, if it
has better working conditions or greater long term earnings
potential. '68
The effect of this consideration analysis is that even a seem-
ingly one-sided promotion constitutes a contract, and thus any
claim by Worker that he has been discriminatorily denied a pro-
motion satisfies § 1981's requirement of a "new and distinct rela-
tion." 69 This result cannot be what the Supreme Court intended,
however, for it would nullify Patterson's purported alteration of
§ 1981's applicability to discriminatory denial of promotion cases.
A saving argument might be that consideration analysis only
determines which contracts are "new," yet Patterson requires that
the contract denied be not merely "new," but "distinct" as well.
Pursuing this argument, it is perhaps possible to use contract law
as a basis for interpreting the "distinctness" requirement as well.
Specifically, one might view a promotion as a modification of an
existing employment contract. By one definition, "[a] modification
of a contract is a change in one or more respects which introduces
new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some of
them, but leaves the general purpose and effect undisturbed. '70
67 Pine River State Bank v Mettille, 333 NW2d 622, 627 (Minn 1983).
"I Carmichael v Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F2d 1126, 1134 (11th Cir 1984) (vacating
the dismissal of plaintiff's claim of discriminatory denial of promotion under Title VII).
The fact that the "consideration" in these examples is non-quantifiable should not pre-
vent a court from finding the existence of adequate "consideration," because the courts do
not generally inquire into the adequacy of consideration. See 1 Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 79 at 200-02, Comment c (1981) ("Restatement, Contracts") and cases cited in
corresponding Appendix at 236-40 (rejecting any requirement of "adequacy" or "sufficiency"
of consideration). See also, for example, Altschul v Sayble, 83 Cal App 3d 153, 147 Cal Rptr
716, 722 (1978); and Harnett v Ryan Homes, Inc., 60 F Supp 878, 890 (W D Pa 1973), aft'd,
496 F2d 832 (3d Cir 1974).
6 Under the "bargain theory" of consideration, any terms that are bargained for serve
as consideration for the contract. The analysis above assumes that any promotion would be
bargained for by the parties. See 1 Restatement, Contracts § 79 at 200, Comment a; and
Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.2 at 41 (cited in note 66).
70 Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v George A. Fuller Co, 776 F2d 198, 208
(7th Cir 1985) (applying Illinois law).
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Such a modification will create a "new" contract consisting of the
terms of the promotion and any terms of the original contract that
remain unchanged.7 1 A modification that alters the purpose and ef-
fect of the contract and leaves no terms of the original contract
intact rises to the level of a rescission of the original contract, thus
making the new agreement "distinct" as well.72
Consider again Ellen Employer's alleged discriminatory denial
of a promotion to William Worker. Had he received the expected
promotion, his new contract would include the terms of the promo-
tion and any remaining terms from the original employment con-
tract. For example, a simple raise would result in a new contract
composed of Worker's original duties and his new wages. However,
the contract would not appear to be "distinct" under modification
analysis: all that has changed is one detail of the original contract,
while the general purpose and effect remain the same.
On the other hand, Worker may argue that he has been denied
a promotion that would have had a much greater impact on the
general purpose of the contract. In such a case, the original con-
tract would be rescinded, and no terms would be carried over to
the post-promotion contract. For example, a promotion that
changed Worker's duties as well as his wages may leave the origi-
nal contract entirely ineffective, with all terms contained in the
"new" contract. In this manner, one may argue that the promotion
results in a contract that is not only "new," but "distinct" as well.
Like consideration analysis, modification analysis appears to
offer some means of distinguishing promotions that merit § 1981
coverage. Unfortunately, like consideration analysis, modification
analysis succeeds only as a technical, abstract concept, with little
grounding in actual practice. First, sole reliance on modification
principles would require some definition of what constitutes a
7' See, for example, Barrett v Lawrence, 110 IlM App 3d 587, 590-91, 66 IlM Dec 173, 442
NE2d 599 (1982); Travelers Insurance Co. v Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal 2d 7, 64
Cal Rptr 440, 434 P2d 992, 998 (1967). Like any new contract, a modification will generally
require consideration to support the new agreement; see Chicago College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 776 F2d at 208; Barnhart v Dollar Rent a Car Systems, 595 F2d 914, 919 (3d Cir
1979) (applying Pennsylvania law). But see Young v United States, 327 F2d 933, 936 (5th
Cir 1964) (applying Alabama law); and Asbestos Products v Healy Mechanical Contractors,
Inc., 306 Minn 74, 235 NW2d 807, 809 (1975) (both cases holding that the oral modification
of a written contract needs no new consideration, because the consideration for the original
contract attaches to the modified contract).
7' See Travelers Insurance Co., 434 P2d at 998. Farnsworth defines "agreement of re-
scission" as a contract in which both parties agree to a discharge of all remaining duties. See
Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.24 at 288 & n 18 (cited in note 66) (noting that "[a]n agreement
of 'partial rescission,' which would discharge less than all the parties' remaining duties of
performance, is best treated as a modification").
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change in a contract's "purpose" and "effect." Consider two fairly
typical examples of promotions. Suppose, first, that Worker's sta-
tus is elevated from wage-earner to salaried employee. Such a pro-
motion appears to be a change only in one detail of the employ-
ment contract, yet one that may represent a significant alteration
in the "effect" of the contract. Alternatively, suppose that
Worker's position is altered from clerk to supervisor. Again, this is
in a sense a change in only one aspect of the original contract, but
it is a modification with major repercussions for the contract's
"purpose."
In each of these examples, modification analysis offers no prin-
cipled means of determining just when the promotion rises beyond
a simple change in the contractual details to a change in the actual
purpose and effect of the contract, thereby becoming sufficiently
"distinct" to merit § 1981 coverage. Contract law, looking as it
does to the bargain of the parties rather than the value of the
terms of the exchange, suggests no concrete, objective standard by
which one may designate certain terms as significant enough to re-
scind the original employment contract.
This flaw in modification analysis could be excised by looking
not at the "change in purpose" or "change in effect" language of
the definition, but rather at the "change in details" language. This
approach asserts that a post-promotion contract is "new and dis-
tinct" for § 1981 purposes if the details have been sufficiently al-
tered so as to amount to a rescission of the original employment
contract. Yet this requires the court to determine exactly what de-
tails are implicit in the original contract, and whether a change in
these implicit details will be sufficient to confirm a rescission of the
original contract in full. The court must still make a subjective de-
termination of the terms of the contract itself.
Consider again the scenario in which Worker has been denied
a pay raise entailing no corresponding change in his duties. The
duties are identical in both contracts, allowing one to say that the
original contract has been modified but not transformed into a
"new and distinct" agreement. However, implicit in the promotion
is Employer's heightened expectation of Worker's staying on the
job. This expectation is not explicit in an at-will employment con-
tract, yet it must be present to some extent. An identical argument
may be made where Worker has been promoted to a higher job
classification without an increase in wages. The original wages ele-
ment of the contract remains after the promotion, yet the new con-
tract contains the implicit term that Worker is now one step higher
in the career ladder.
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This complication is somewhat analogous to our earlier discus-
sion of consideration. An employment contract by its very nature
contains many implicit, perhaps intangible, details of the employ-
ment relationship.73 The working relationship is composed of inter-
related mechanics, a series of exchanges by which Worker and Em-
ployer each benefits, even though the benefits may not be
manifested in the contract itself. Assuming that the typical promo-
tion is devoid of gratuitous offers of higher pay or greater effort,
any modification of the original agreement will to some extent alter
the implicit terms of the contract. Looking only to the explicit de-
tails of the contract (namely, the wages and duties terms) ignores
th6 realities of the employment relationship.
Thus, it is difficult to develop a satisfactory definition of "new
and distinct relation" by drawing solely on contract law principles.
True, the text of § 1981 requires a denial of the right to make a
contract, and in some circumstances it thus becomes necessary to
look to state contract law to determine whether a contract is in-
volved. But dependence on state contract law is far more problem-
atic in the promotion context. There, an employment contract is
clearly present, and the post-Patterson problem is one of deter-
mining whether a second, suitably "new and distinct" contract has
entered the picture. Whether one looks for an exchange of consid-
eration, or for a modification sufficient to stand apart from the
original contract, it is evident that any conceivable promotion may
arguably reach the level of a "new and distinct" contract cogniza-
ble under § 1981. This result was clearly not intended by the Pat-
terson Court. If one cannot garner any functional definition of a
"new and distinct relation" from Hishon or contract law, where
then can one turn?
IV. DESIGNING A FRAMEWORK
A. Initial Approaches
As should be evident, the "new and distinct relation" test has
no explicit foundation. Yet the lower courts need a working defini-
tion that reflects Patterson's apparent desire to restrict the scope
of § 1981 through reference to contract law and Hishon. We have
seen that a workable definition of "new and distinct relation" can-
not be divined from either of these sources individually. Abstract-
ing an explanation of the Hishon citation produces a formula by
73 Travelers Insurance Co., 434 P2d at 998.
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which courts can limit the types of promotions cognizable under
§ 1981, but it does not take into account the Patterson Court's
explicit reliance on the making of a contract as the touchstone for
liability. Hishon alone helps us to understand what a "distinct"
relation is, but not what a "new" relation is. Contract law princi-
ples, meanwhile, provide no objective measures by which a court
can assess a promotion claim, and even if functional, ignore Pat-
terson's express reference to Hishon.
The Patterson Court, at the very least, established that two
chief concerns must underlie categorization of those promotions
cognizable under § 1981: (1) a right to make a contract must be
implicated; and (2) § 1981 must not be viewed as the mere exten-
sion of Title VII, thereby requiring that § 1981 cover fewer promo-
tion denials than would Title VII. Using these two standards, this
Comment provides a workable definition that satisfies the Court's
twin concerns while anticipating the types of promotion cases that
the lower courts are facing in the wake of Patterson.
Patterson's concern that a promotion contract must be nar-
rowly defined to be cognizable under § 1981 can be met by focusing
on only the tangible benefits received by both Employer and
Worker. The consideration and modification analyses ran aground
only when the courts were left with no principled basis for deciding
which non-tangible benefits could support a finding that a promo-
tion was "new and distinct." This indeterminacy problem can be
solved by arguing that a promotion constitutes a "new and distinct
relation" cognizable under § 1981 where each party has received
some tangible benefit from the other. The only tangible benefits
that are common to all promotions are responsibilities or wages,
and it is to these benefits that courts seeking to implement Patter-
son have primarily looked. This requirement solves the considera-
tion problem, because each party receives tangible benefits and
agrees to undergo tangible detriments. The requirement also solves
the modification problem because the purpose of the contract is
cabined by the concrete terms of the agreement, the most essential
of which are obviously one's responsibilities and wages. Thus,
under this analysis some promotions will be actionable, but not all.
Reference to Hishon further bolsters this definition, incorpo-
rating the Court's citation of the case in Patterson and its prefer-
ence that Title VII and § 1981 overlap as little as possible. As
noted earlier, all promotions constitute terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment under Title VII. Hishon, however, suggests
that some promotions are more clearly included in the original
contract agreement and hence are more clearly terms of employ-
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ment than are others. Hence, by limiting § 1981 to those promo-
tions that are granted not as a result of the original contract provi-
sion, but due to the employee's accomplishments, one can reduce
the overlap between Title VII and § 1981 in a manageable and pre-
dictable manner. Under this standard, a promotion represents a
"new and distinct relation" where it is not granted as a matter of
course. Rather than focusing on the terms of the promotion, the
court must focus on the regularity of such promotions among simi-
larly situated employees.
B. The Proposed Standard
As illustrated in the previous section, any definition of "new
and distinct relation" must satisfy the two main concerns of Pat-
terson that the promotion would have involved the basic compo-
nents of a new contractual arrangement and that the promotion
would not have occurred as a matter of course. The following stan-
dard fulfills the Patterson Court's mandate: A promotion consti-
tutes a "new and distinct relation" cognizable under § 1981 where
there has been a tangible change in responsibilities and wages, and
the discriminatorily denied promotion is not granted routinely to
similarly situated workers.
This definition accommodates Patterson and Hishon. As
noted earlier, Hishon rested on two chief considerations. First, one
must consider the contractual nature of the employment relation-
ship.7-' Second, one must consider whether the change in this rela-
tionship is so routine as to constitute a simple "term of employ-
ment.17 Patterson's reliance on Hishon as the sole support for the
"new and distinct relation" standard strengthens the force of the
framework proposed by this Comment.
The framework may prove somewhat harsh when the expected
promotion would meet one of the two prongs of the proposed stan-
dard, but not both. Consider an employee who applies for a promo-
tion available only to those who have achieved some outstanding
level of performance. Suppose further that the promotion would
involve taking on some supervisory responsibility, but would entail
no immediate financial benefits; rather, the new position would put
the employee directly in line for a management position. Denying
an employee this particular promotion on account of his race
7' 467 US at 74.
76 Id at 76.
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would not be actionable under the proposed standard, yet its clear
satisfaction of the simple Hishon prong gives one pause.
Nonetheless, the analysis implements Patterson without being
excessively severe. First, this definition eliminates judicial subjec-
tivity in determining what constitutes a promotion, thereby in-
creasing consistency of results. In most of the post-Patterson cases
discussed in Section I, courts reached their final determinations ei-
ther by asserting that the facts did not quite measure up to those
in Hishon, e or by conclusorily stating that the promotion would
not have been sufficiently "new and distinct."77 The requirement
of a mutual alteration in the positions of the employer and em-
ployee provides an objective definition of a "new" contract. The
"non-routineness" of the promotion provides an objective standard
that prevents § 1981 from applying to all promotions, in accor-
dance with the Supreme Court's desire that the "new" contract be
"distinct" as well.
Consider a promotion entailing a raise of thirty cents per hour
accompanied by a minor change in the employee's duties. The pro-
motion would clearly be covered by § 1981 under the proposed
analysis (assuming no evidence of routineness), whereas some post-
Patterson courts might find the change in position insufficiently
new and distinct. Because there is no principled way of distin-
guishing this promotion from any other involving a mutual ex-
change of concrete terms between employer and employee, the pro-
posed approach is satisfied without any encroachment on
Patterson's principles. This suggests that some post-Patterson
cases were decided incorrectly, most notably Patterson itself on
remand.8
Second, the definition of a routine or non-routine promotion
may be limited, further reducing judicial subjectivity. A "routine"
promotion could safely be limited to a change in wages and/or re-
sponsibilities given to all employees at some point in time merely
as a consequence of having entered into the original employment
agreement. 9
71 See Sofferin, 717 F Supp at 599.
7 See Dicker, 730 F Supp at 114.
78 See Patterson, 729 F Supp at 35.
79 Note that the Hishon Court found that consideration for promotion to partner in a
law firm might very well be "routine" under Title VII. 467 US at 76. Thus, a failure to
interpret "routine" narrowly under § 1981 would require a court to find the Hishon scenario
itself non-actionable after Patterson, an outcome somewhat absurd in light of the Supreme
Court's citation to Hishon. On the other hand, the Hishon Court found partnership consid-
eration to be routine, not actual promotions to partner. Hence, the denial of the actual
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On the whole, this framework appears to offer sufficient pro-
tection to employees under § 1981, while at the same time adher-
ing to both Patterson concerns: that a right to make a contract be
infringed, and the preference for Title VII where a clear term of
employment is involved. An application of the proposed approach
to the leading lower court cases issued in the wake of Patterson
will highlight its operation.
C. Applying the Standard
Rather than applying the proposed standard to hypothetical
scenarios, in this Section I will apply the standard to the fact pat-
terns of post-Patterson cases. These cases can be grouped into
three basic categories based on their compliance with the two
prongs of the proposed test: whether there has been a mutual, tan-
gible change in responsibilities and wages, and whether the dis-
criminatorily denied promotion is granted routinely to similarly
situated workers.
1. Category 1: Both prongs satisfied.
Typical of this category are cases such as Luna v City and
County of Denver,80 Green v Kinney Shoe Corp.,"' and Hudgens v
Harper-Grace Hospitals,"2 each of which entailed an increase in
both responsibilities and wages,8 3 thus satisfying the contract law
prong. The contract model allows us to avoid the additional factors
considered by these courts, such as changes in required qualifica-
tions, potential liability, or pension benefits. These factors remain
relevant only to the extent that they prove the employee's respon-
sibilities (or wages) have indeed been altered. Thus, once a court
has found a change in both responsibilities and compensation, it
need not engage in the weighing of various factors as suggested by
Hudgens.
The outcome under the simple Hishon prong is less certain, as
few relevant facts were enunciated in any of these cases. However,
promotion to partner might arguably constitute a "non-routine" promotion cognizable
under our § 1981 analysis.
80 718 F Supp 854 (D Colo 1989). The cases mentioned in this subsection are addressed
more fully in the text at notes 32-34.
31 728 F Supp 768 (D DC 1989).
92 728 F Supp 1321 (E D Mich 1990).
8S This analysis assumes that a change in status from hourly to salaried employee con-
stitutes an increase in pay. Even the narrowest readings of Patterson have recognized such a
contractual alteration as sufficient under § 1981. See, for example, Patterson, 729 F Supp at
36 (on remand).
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one can probably safely assume that a promotion from "Project
Inspector I" to "Engineer III ' 84 or from salesman to manager"
would not come part and parcel with the job, but rather as a result
of the employee's individual achievement. At least one of these
courts did note that plaintiff had to bid for his desired promotion,
which would seem to make the advancement non-routine.8 6
2. Category 2: Neither prong satisfied.
This category is best represented byDicker v Allstate Life In-
surance Co.,87 where the plaintiffs had been denied promotions
within a progressive line of positions that ultimately might result
in a category-one type promotion. As the plaintiffs were not denied
a promotion entailing a change in responsibilities, the mere
achievement of greater proximity to such a promotion does not
satisfy the contract model. Moreover, there is evidence that plain-
tiffs would also fail under the simple Hishon prong: such promo-
tions were apparently granted frequently, with no need for employ-
ees to apply for the positions."' Thus, under either prong a mere
step along the "line of progression" towards a category-one promo-
tion falls short of a "new and distinct relation." 89
The same can be said of a'case in which the promotion would
have simply entailed an increase in wages, such as Williams v Na-
tional RR Passenger Corp.9 0 Again, only half the equation of the
contract model has been satisfied. Moreover, although there was no
evidence to this effect, a basic pay raise would probably serve as
the clearest illustration of a term of employment granted routinely,
without special consideration of the employee's achievements or
promotion requests, thereby failing to satisfy the Hishon prong.
3. Category 3: Indeterminate cases.
Not every promotion fits comfortably into one of the above
categories. Take, for example, Sofferin v American Airlines, Inc.,
involving a promotion of an airline co-pilot from probationary to
tenured status.9 1 The Sofferin decision, holding that the plaintiff's
Luna, 718 F Supp at 857.
85 Green, 728 F Supp at 777.
Hudgens, 728 F Supp at 1321-22.
9' 730 F Supp 111 (N D Ill 1989).
Id at 112.
89 See id at 114.
90 716 F Supp 49, 51 (D DC 1989).
91 717 F Supp 597 (N D Ill 1989).
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claim was not cognizable under § 1981, would appear correct under
the contract model, as the court found that the plaintiff's responsi-
bilities would not have changed had he been promoted.92
On the other hand, the outcome under the Hishon prong may
be quite different. Here, it is necessary to determine whether a
promotion to tenured status generally followed the probation pe-
riod. If not, then this promotion would rise to the level of a "new
and distinct relation," a conclusion contrary to the outcome of the
contract approach. But, even if the promotion would not have been
made as a matter of course, courts should not hold this kind of
transition in employment status to be sufficient for § 1981 cover-
age. To hold otherwise would "swallow up the rule announced in
Patterson."9
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v McLean Credit
Union requires courts to remove certain promotions from the pur-
view of § 1981, but provides no historically or legally supportable
means of doing so. As a result, those courts that have addressed
the promotion issue in the aftermath of Patterson have done so
without any logical, consistent principle guiding their decisions.
The approach proposed by this Comment offers one possible
method of facing the issue in a somewhat less ad hoc fashion. The
approach melds the abstract elements of both the contract law
analogy and the Title VII analogy, thereby accommodating the two
chief concerns of the Patterson Court-namely, that any definition
of promotion be grounded in the text of § 1981, and that Title VII
be preserved as a meaningful remedy for employment discrimina-
tion. This Comment's approach comfortably accommodates most
of the cases decided in Patterson's immediate aftermath, while at
the same time balancing the concerns of the Patterson Court with
§ 1981's anti-discriminatory mandate.
' Id at 599. The court reasoned that, in contrast to the employment status change in
Sofferin, in Hishon "[p]romotion from associate to partner involves changes in compensa-
tion computation, responsibility, and, potentially, liability. In effect, it is a transformation
from employee to employer." Id. See also text at notes 76-77.
93 Id.
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